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Introduction: 
Communities concerned with external costs of city expansion in much of Oregon 
developed an “Urban Growth Boundary” (UGB) in the 1970’s as a tool to limit the 
amount a city can grow in size.  As industries continue to adapt to an ever-fluctuating 
consumer dynamic, industry turnover remains high, leaving older factories in their wake 
while putting new ones on the edges of the city.  As the new factories threaten communal 
values represented in the UGB, the older buildings represent both a problem and an 
opportunity.  These aged and sometimes abandoned buildings detract from the city’s 
aesthetics, pose potential safety risks to surrounding neighborhoods, and tie up 
potentially usable land (Bartsch & Collation, 1997).  For decades, Oregon cities have 
tried to revamp areas with heavy concentrations of these less-competitive and 
economically lagging industries, usually with little success.  These buildings frequently 
have a real or perceived contamination that makes redevelopment costly and raises 
uncertain liability issues to owners of such property.  When this happens, plots of land 
are often labeled as “brownfields” (Simons, 1998).  This term can be characterized on 
one end of a continuum, ranging from heavily used, contaminated land (brownfields), to 
plots of land with no buildings, infrastructure, or contamination risks (greenfield).  In the 
middle of this continuum is what is termed here as “grayfields”.  These, as defined here, 
hold buildings, but are not deemed contaminated. This spans a plethora of sites, ranging 
from heavily-used, but not yet contaminated plots, to a newly built house in a zone 
previously classified as greenfield.  
 Brownfields and their related contamination have been under the public eye for 
quite some time.  In 1980, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
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and Liability Act (CERCLA) was enacted.  The primary intent of this act is to hold recent 
and current owners responsible for costs of cleanup for “any release or threat of release of 
hazardous substances.”  It is believed that the act has “caused considerable confusion and 
uncertainty (Collation & Bartsch, 1997),” for purchasers of brownfield sites due to the 
vague nature of the law.  Collation and Bartsch go on to say that this uncertainty tied with 
mandatory cleanup has further increased the premium for greenfields.  With that being 
said, moving from green to brown on the color continuum generally allows for more 
readily available infrastructure, meaning some costs can be reduced or eliminated.  
According to a case study done by the Port of Portland, though, the greenfield sites do 
have lower costs required when transforming the land by the purchaser, maintaining 
higher residual land value.  This is important because economic theory suggests 
developers only take part in development of  a parcel of land if the “value of the parcel 
converted to a new use, net of construction costs, exceeds the value of the parcel 
remaining in its current use (McGrath, 2000).”   
 Certain tools developed by city commissioners have profound effects on what 
plots are deemed cost effective to infill.  Originally created to decrease unemployment in 
the early 1980’s, enterprise zones give special tax benefits to firms investing in 
economically lagging areas.  Combined efforts from the Board of Commissioners of Lane 
County and city officials drew the Springfield and West Eugene Enterprise Zones to hold 
some of the potentially most viable, yet still economically lagging areas in Lane County.  
The Springfield Enterprise Zone held firm from initiation in 1988, while the West Eugene 
Enterprise Zone ran from 1987, then was shut down in 1997 due to both a thriving 
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economy and political controversy.  In 2005, though, the West Eugene Enterprise Zone 
was re-established as an attempt to enhance the local economy. 
Using a hedonic pricing model, our research is twofold: One, we attempt to 
statistically estimate the market premium greenfield sites have over brownfield and 
possibly grayfield sites; and two, we analyze the West Eugene and Springfield Enterprise 
Zones’ ability to increase the value for these sites.  In determining the premium 
greenfield sites hold, it is difficult to eliminate the bias location has.  Clearly, sites 
located close to the downtown area, interstate highways, and other key positions 
increases value on its own, and many brownfield sites inherit that advantage.  Greenfield 
sites, on the other hand, are often on the fringes of the city, and this must be controlled 
for.  Additionally, pre-enterprise zone and post-enterprise zone data is important in 
determining the zoning’s actual effect.  Fortunately, the fact that the West Eugene 
Enterprise Zone was eliminated in 1997, only to be restarted later, gives us a window in 
which prices should not have been affected by the enterprise zone.  The Springfield 
Enterprise Zone has remained constant and when it was up for extension there were no 
uncertainties that it might not return. 
Our research aims at informing effective policy development for encouraging 
infilling and rebuilding.  Determining the market value effect enterprise zoning has on 
lots will show the quantitative impact the legislation has on firms’ perceptions of value 
these lots have.  This research is important for policy makers and community members 
alike, as it estimates the impact of current policy on the community’s desire to infill and 
slow the growth of the UGB. 
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 We find that brownfields have no real effect on prices in Eugene.  This may be 
due to a sample selection bias, as we are only observing lots that were sold, as well as the 
limited number of brownfields in Eugene (we observed 15).  We also find that 
greenfields have a substantial premium when dealing with land price.  The enterprise 
zone, however, has not only a negative impact on prices as a whole, but land prices of 
lots as well.  This reflects a negative effect of enterprise zoning, omitted variables, or 
some other data related problem. 
 First, this paper provides a literature review of studies relating to brownfields, 
greenfields, and enterprise zones.  We are looking for methods used in determining their 
effects on prices, what their effects might be, and what research remains to be done.  
Next, the paper dives into our hypotheses, and explains our rationale behind them.  After 
this, we describe the data we collected in order to test these hypotheses.  Next, in our 
economic methodology section, we will be explaining the base model used throughout 
our regressions.  This will be followed by our results and analysis, then ended with a 
section devoted to conclusion and room for future research. 
 
Literature Review: 
The hedonic model is a useful way to break down statistically the sales price of a 
parcel of land into its non-market characteristics.  It has been used extensively after the 
seminal paper by Sherwin Rosen in 1974.  The model has been extended to many 
different markets, from looking at environmental variables and their effect on home sales, 
to looking at compensation differentials based upon risk on the job.  There has been much 
discussion in the literature about the proper functional form and the quality of results 
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from using a single market.  A hedonic model takes the market price of the land and 
regresses it against the different characteristics that would affect the value of that parcel.  
This derives each characteristic’s statistically implied affect on the market outcome.  One 
thing that we are assuming when using time series data is that the demand for these 
characteristics stays fairly constant over time.  Past literature regresses sales price against 
a vector of land characteristics, city wide characteristics, their dummies of brownfield 
measures, and, when applicable, whether or not the site was in an enterprise zone 
(Alberini 2005, Howland 2000 & Schoenbaum 2002).  
Schoenbaum (2002) studied the Baltimore area looking at land values and 
brownfield designation.  Data from 1963 to 1999 was used, with land values a proxy for 
sales price.   Land values were used to gain more observations for a more meaningful 
analysis.  Land values and sales prices were found to be highly correlated (.78) making 
land values a suitable proxy.  It was found that there was no relationship between 
environmental contamination and land use variables, land vacancy rates, or property 
turnover.  Another analysis looked at the amount of economic development, broken down 
into development, redevelopment, and demolition and found no relationship as well.  
This analysis suggests that the under-use of land, that brownfield policies were supposed 
to address, is due to some other reason than contamination issues. 
Jackson (2002) analyzed the selling prices of industrial lands to see how they are 
impacted by contamination.  In addition, he analyzed whether selling prices rebounded 
after remediation of contaminated lands.  He used data of identified contaminated and 
previously contaminated sites from the Los Angeles, San Diego, and Orange and Ventura 
counties.  He found that, “for previously contaminated and remediated properties, this 
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analysis finds no statistically significant sales price differences from otherwise 
comparable but uncontaminated properties (Jackson 2002)”.  He also found that 
properties with current contamination and no remediation were selling for 30% discounts 
compared to clean properties.  This study finds that contamination only affects properties 
selling prices in the duration that the property doesn’t have remediation. 
Howland (2000) studied the transactions of industrial land in Baltimore and found 
that buyers are purchasing land but only at discounts.  The land that is selling and being 
reused is generally the larger plots of land on the market.  She tracked, over a two and a 
half year period, industrial properties as either currently in use, unoccupied, on the 
market, or sold.  It was found that less than 5% of the land was either idle or not on the 
market.  The market was simply adjusting by transacting these properties at discounted 
prices instead of remain on the market for sale for years. 
 In a 2004 study, Howland, explored these issues further and, through interviews 
with real estate agents found that the most significant barriers to land reuse were 
incompatible land uses and inadequate infrastructure.  The market has already taken care 
of potential or known contamination through discounting the sales price.  When looking 
at historic transactions in Baltimore, it was found that most of the properties were sold as 
clean sites, “15% are parcels that had confirmed contamination at their time of sale 
(Howland 2004).”  It was also found that there were more sales in the later parts of the 
decade after there were improvements in remediation procedures, lenders better able to 
assess risk, and growing certainty about governmental cleanup standards.  The larger 
problem of underused land parcels then is being motivated by their incapability with 
current use demands.  Howland did interviews with real estate agents and property 
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owners for parcels that had been on the market for over 2 years and the common 
problems with redevelopment, “small, odd shaped sites; expense of removing obsolete 
buildings; outdated road size and configurations; inadequate water, sewer, and 
telecommunication infrastructure; existing land incompatible with industry (Howland 
2004).”  Her final analysis shows that parcels with known contamination sold at 67% 
discounts, suspected parcels at 65%, and parcels of land near contaminated sites at 42% 
discounts. 
In another study of contamination risk study in the Baltimore area, Alberto Longo 
and Anna Alberini look at the relationship between the distance of a known contaminated 
site (one listed on a public registry) and it’s monetary effect on the selling price of a 
parcel.  The end result is that they found no relationship between proximity to a known 
contaminated brownfield site and the selling price of another parcel of land.  In other 
words, there is no evidence of spillovers to unaffected properties from being near a 
contaminated site.  This study included a dummy variable for if the site was in an 
enterprise zone to look at how some government interventions have influenced land 
values.  The result was that enterprise zones and other forms of government intervention 
had little effect on selling prices.  The selling price of the land was found to be more 
impacted by dimensions of the property other than potential contamination, “the 
dimensions of the parcel, the type of activity and land use, the location of parcel, the 
presence of buildings and their age, and the socio-economic characteristics of the census 
tract where the site is located (Longo 2005).”  The paper cites another study, Ihlanfeldt 
and Taylor (2004), which studied the Atlanta area and found that there were effects on 
selling prices for properties near a contaminated site.  In general this was an illustration 
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that the characteristics of the land and the city itself will have more of an impact then just 
looking at brownfield issues broadly.  The Longo paper points out that both Atlanta and 
Baltimore are very different cities, Atlanta enjoying more growth and fewer contaminated 
sites.  The paper ends by giving some general conclusions, that there is little incentive to 
clean up a contaminated parcel of land if the value of the land will not go up once the 
contamination is completed.  This then would indicate that the problem of contamination 
is again not the ultimate cause of the brownfield problem. 
Jackson (2001) studied the effect of previously contaminated industrial properties 
and their post-cleanup selling prices.  He found that sites, after completing remediation, 
had their selling prices return to levels of similar parcels of uncontaminated land.  This 
shows that the price discounts inherent in contaminated sites is reversible.  There is 
incentive then for firms to remediate their properties to increase their parcels market 
value to be comparable to uncontaminated land prices in their respective city.  Jackson 
did use a limited model in that he only regressed in a linear form and sales of properties 
that happened before remediation or during were ignored. 
Anna Alberini (2005) looked at participation in government development 
programs (Voluntary Cleanup Programs, Enterprise Zones, Brownfield Zone 
Designations, etc…) and explored the effect on selling prices in the state of Colorado.  It 
is theoretically possible for the government to encourage redevelopment of certain 
parcels of land through different types of incentives offered to firms that meet certain 
requirements.  The author’s main area of study was the Voluntary Cleanup Program and 
exploring issues with participation in this program, “Voluntary cleanup programs are 
based on the premise that protection from liability is desirable and should increase the 
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attractiveness of a property,” (Alberini 2005).  The same argument could be given to 
Enterprise Zones in that they make the land more attractive since there would be the 
option of tax breaks for firms that make required investments.  Parcels of land will be 
reinvested in if they are given incentives.  More detailed research looking at the effects of 
properties in an Enterprise Zones and sales prices showed a price discount of 43% 
(Alberini 27).  More evidence, which matches results found by studies done by Jackson 
and Howland, finds that sites with confirmed contamination sell for discounts of 47% 
relative to comparably uncontaminated sites (Alberini 28).   
Our literature review would seem to give credence, first mentioned by Howland 
and reiterated by Schoenbaum, to the idea that it might not be the contamination risk that 
is the primary cause of developers leaving brownfield sites vacant but the fact that these 
brownfield sites are not compatible to current uses that are demanded.  Even if 
contamination were a problem the land would sell at a discount and there is evidence that 
this happens (Howland).  The broader problem is the parcels of land that are vacant are 
not the characteristics that are demanded in today’s market or that the infrastructure is in 
disrepair.  The fact that these lands happen to be the sites that are most likely 
contaminated due to historical uses is just a coincidence.   
 
Hypothesis Development: 
Our guiding hypotheses are that greenfields hold a premium over brownfields and 
that location in an enterprise zone increases the value of lots, all else equal.  We believe 
lots classified as “brownfield” will have an overall lower price, all else equal, as 
suggested by previous research (McGrath, 2000; Schoenbaum, 2002; 
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“Brownfield/Greenfield Development Cost Comparison Study”).  Although the direction 
of the effect is fairly straightforward, determining the specific magnitude will provide 
greater interest.  Also interesting, is the effect being classified as a brownfield has on 
simply the price of the land sold.  We believe that brownfield classification will have a 
strong negative effect on the price of land being sold, with no effect on the price of the 
building being sold.  Under this theory, the reverse should be true for greenfields; there 
should be a higher price for the land as it is deemed clean of any impurities. 
While previous research seems lacking in possible grayfield premiums, we hope 
to control for it.  According to our color continuum, grayfields come in different levels of 
intensity.  They can be heavily used, or light to zero use.  We believe that the amount of 
use will be tied strongly to the amount of investment over time put into the lots.  We will 
use the “improved value” or “value added” to the land as a proxy for this. 
The second part of our hypothesis is that enterprise zoning will increase the value 
of the land.  This should be true, as the tax breaks provided effectively reduce the costs 
associated with owning a plot of land.  As the costs decrease, theoretically, developers 
will be willing to pay a higher price for the land.  One problem that remains, however, is 
limitations on who gets the tax breaks.  First, businesses must “invest at least $50,000 in 
a building or major equipment within the enterprise zone,” and second, “increase their 
employment in the zone by at least 10 percent (Warren, 2005).”  This may lead to 
uncertainties and have a diminishing or nullifying effect on the premium paid for being in 
the enterprise zone.  Within our data, there are actually two enterprise zones available.  
One covers west Eugene (The West Eugene Enterprise Zone) and one that covers most of 
Springfield.  Springfield’s enterprise zone has been effective for over 20 years and covers 
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Springfield almost entirely.  This complete coverage combined with no testable years of 
deactivations makes it difficult to estimate the effects of the enterprise zone, and thus, we 
will not be testing it.  Eugene’s, on the other hand, had a gap between 1997 and 2005 
where the zone was shut down, and covers a small corner of their total city (less than one 
forth of its total size).  This gap allows us to have effectively “enterprise-zone-free” lots 
to compare the direct effect of re-establishing the zone in 2005 and the effects of the zone 
prior to its termination. 
 
Data Description 
 
Our data was collected courtesy of Lane Council of Governments (LCOG) using 
land information from the Regional Land Information Database (RLID).  Data was 
extracted for properties with only industrial zoning codes so that we could focus on 
industrial properties.  Spatial information on the industrial plots of land (e.g., distance to 
city center) was collected through the software program Geographic Information System 
(GIS).   
The RLID database offers the most comprehensive and readily available statistical 
data for the land market of Eugene/Springfield.  The data offers a multitude of statistics 
including selling prices (when available), assessed land value, the value of improvements 
done to the land, the current zoning, the current use of the land, spatial coordinates for the 
site for GIS, address, date of deed transfers, the acreage of the site, and other statistics 
about the land.  LCOG maintains the database and gets their data from the tax assessor’s 
office.  These data were compiled for us by Sherry Giglia at the Lane Council of 
Governments in April of 2006. 
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There are a few adjustments that were made to the raw data before it was in 
usable form.  First, we eliminated the observations that had sales prices of zero or NULL.  
We assume that this data was the result of an ownership transfer, such as a plot of land 
changing hands through inheritance.  This represents either data mis-entry or a non-
market transactions which we do not want to include in our analysis.  In addition, any 
observations with sales prices less then $1,000 were dropped, as these properties must 
have other circumstances that are resulting in this abnormally low sales price.  To correct 
our sales prices for inflation, we used data from Oregon State on inflation conversion 
factors to get our sales prices in terms of 2005 dollars.  For a more detailed description of 
other adjustments, read Appendix A. 
Using unique maplot ID’s for each property, we were able to merge our initial 
sample of industrial properties into LCOG’s 2004 release of GIS data.  Virtually all the 
data transferred, with only 18 of over 2,000 observations dropping.  The dummy 
variables for the Eugene and Springfield enterprise zones were then created using the GIS 
layers given to us by the respective cities’ enterprise zone managers.  Our distance 
variables were calculated “as the crow files” due to time constraints.  We calculated 
distances to 27 locations which included a mix of interchanges of major freeways in the 
area and the city centers of the respective cities.  Our final three distance variables were 
the minimum distances to I5 points, to the other highways in town, and to the city 
centers.  
Dummy variables for what year the property sold are included to capture the 
effects that the passage of time has on prices.  These effects do not include inflation, 
since we have already corrected for this in our adjusted selling price.  Other effects that 
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these year dummies would capture is the condition of the economy, any trends in land 
prices over time, and preference changes of land over the period. 
Our measure of greenfield was obtained by assigning a “1” to a property if its 
improved value was zero, and “0” otherwise.  This is a safe bet since there has been no 
money added in addition to the land value to the property.  One problem with this and 
other measures in our regressions, is that we are making the assumption that all 
characteristics observed now (zoning, improvement values, etc.) were the same when the 
land was sold (1988-present).  This is not always a fair assumption, and should be 
considered in future research.    
Lastly, our measure of brownfield was taken from the Department of 
Environmental Quality database of contaminated properties in Eugene and Springfield.  
There were not many brownfield industrial properties that were in our final regression 
analysis.  This suggests that there is little historical contamination in the Eugene area.  
Our conclusions may be different from more problematic cities such as Baltimore and 
other east coast cities which have been analyzed in previous literature. 
Our dependent variables were an inflation adjusted price and the adjusted price 
multiplied by one minus the improvement ratio.  The second price should give us the 
percentage of the price associated with the land sold in the lot.  We considered anything 
sold above $10 million an outlier, which were only in a couple observations.  We also 
considered properties with acres of over 20 as outliers, as they represented only a handful 
of properties. 
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Econometric Methodology: 
We examine the determinants of land prices using a hedonic price function which 
allows us to determine various characteristics’ effects on market sales prices of land 
plots.  This will enable us to see what effect being a greenfield, brownfield, or being in 
the West Eugene Enterprise Zone has on sales prices of those parcels of land.  
We can think of the sales price of the land (PX) being equal to that parcel of land’s 
different characteristics, Zi, and these characteristics are highly heterogeneous.  This can 
be captured in equation (1) where Z is the numerical level of the characteristic being 
measured. 
                                PX = h(Z1, Z2,….Zi)     (1) 
 As implemented by Alberto Longo and Anna Alberini, we will be using a hedonic 
price model to evaluate the market value impact of enterprise zoning on brownfield 
development.   The base hedonic model we are using has the following format: 
Ln(Sales Pricei) = α + β1 ln(Acreagei) + β2 (ln(Acreagei))
2 + β3 ln(Improvement Ratio) + 
β4 (ln(Improvement Ratio))
2 + β5 Distance to Eugene Center + β6 Distance to Closest 
HWY On-Ramp + β7 Distance to Closest I-5 On-Ramp + D8 West Eugene Enterprise 
Zone Properties + D9 West Eugene Enterprise Effective + D10 Brownfield + D11 
Greenfield + D12 Eugene + D13 Industrial Zoning 1 + D14 Industrial Zoning 2 + D15 
Industrial Zoning 3 + D16 Year One + D17 Year Two + … D15+N Year N 
 
• i denotes different sales transactions 
• Sales Price is the sales price for the particular sales transaction 
• Acreage is the number of acres in the lot sold 
• Improvement Ratio is the tax assessed improvement value (building) divided by 
tax assessed improvement value plus tax assessed land value.  This is a proxy for 
the portion of the lot’s value attributed to the building 
• Distance to Eugene Center is the distance from the site to Eugene’s Courthouse 
• Distance to Closest HWY On-Ramp represents the distance to the closest 
available on-ramp for the site 
• Distance to Closest I-5 On-Ramp is the distance to the closest I-5 interchange or 
on-ramp 
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• West Eugene Enterprise Zone Properties is set to 1 when the lot is within the 
boundaries of the original West Eugene Enterprise Zone (regardless of whether or 
not it is in effect), 0 when not 
• West Eugene Enterprise Zone Effective is set to 1 when the lot is within the 
boundaries of the original West Eugene Enterprise Zone, and the zoning is in 
effect (0 when not) 
• Brownfield is 0 when site has no contamination, 1 when site has contamination 
• Greenfield is 0 when lot has been built on, 1 when site has had no structures  
• Eugene is set to 0 when lot is not in Eugene’s borders, 1 when it is in their borders 
• Industrial Zoning (1, 2, or 3) is the classification of the types of products that can 
be used on/produced within the factory as permitted by the city of Eugene and 
Lane County.  Set to 1 if zoning is of the corresponding number (1, 2, or 3). 
 
Empirical Results 
 Table 2 and 3 represent the results that will be discussed further in this section.  
Table 2 looks at the adjusted selling price (section A) that was observed in the data while 
table 3 looks at the portion of the price derived from the land (section B).  Columns 2-4 
examine how sensitive our results are to different time frames.  Our database only has 
characteristics for the present time period, while sales data go back 20 years.  If we use 
our full 20-year sample of sales price we implicitly assume land and property 
characteristics have not changed.  Properties that have sold closer to the present should 
have few to no changes in land characteristics.  For each section we include interaction 
terms to get a better picture of how greenfield and brownfield are affected by the 
enterprise zone incentives.   
For both regressions, we find that the results explain roughly half of the observed 
variation in the data.  The R2 is generally larger when we include the interaction terms, 
giving our model jointly better explanatory power.  F-tests reject the null hypothesis that 
our coefficients are insignificant.   
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I. Selling price of the property  
Column 1 of Table 2 provides our base estimates for determinants of industrial 
property pricing in the Eugene-Springfield metro area.   
 
A) Main Determinants of Industrial Property Prices 
The main determinant of land selling price is the number of acres of the parcel.  
With our variables in logarithms, the coefficient estimates can be read as elasticity.  Our 
estimates suggest that an increase in an industrial property’s acreage by 10% increases 
the selling price of the land by 6%.  However, the negative coefficient on the “acreage 
squared” variable suggests that for larger properties this elasticity is even smaller.  Both 
of these findings are significant at the 1% level.  It is not surprising that there is a lower 
elasticity at higher acreage properties, as many firms would find larger properties too big 
for their use.   
 The improvement ratio is also positively related to the market price of an 
industrial property.  Our findings indicate that when you increase the improvement ratio 
by 10%, the selling price will increase by 3.8%.  Like acreage, the “improvement ratio 
squared” coefficient suggests that this elasticity increases for properties where the value 
of the buildings (and other improvements) becomes very high relative to the land value.  
These results are significant at the 1% level.  Improvement ratio is our proxy for building 
values, so it is no surprise that this variable is highly significant.  When firms find a plot 
of land that are more suitable for their needs, it may be cheaper for them to use it rather 
than purchase a greenfield to create a building for their needs. 
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The coefficients on the distance variables show there is no significant impact on 
industrial land prices, save for the coefficient on distance to Eugene city center variable. 
These estimates are expressed in terms of elasticity.  As expected, location further away 
from the city center negatively impacts selling prices. This is significant at the 1% level.  
A comparable industrial property that is 10% further away from the city center will sell 
for 3.77% less.  This is clear evidence that being further away from the city center is not 
optimal as most of the population and infrastructure is concentrated closer in to the city.  
Being further away from highway or I-5 on ramps seems to have a positive impact on 
industrial property prices but these results are not significant.  This might point out that 
Eugene-Springfield is not that large of an area making it quick to get freight out of town. 
The dummy variable coefficients capture the impact of the different industrial 
zonings classifications that are used in the Eugene-Springfield area on industrial 
properties prices.  Our estimates suggest that regardless of the zoning designation the 
selling price will be statistically similar, holding all other land characteristics constant, to 
other zoning coded lands.  The dummy variable for land transacting in Eugene is not 
statistically significant, indicating that there may be little difference between industrial 
properties selling in Eugene from properties selling in Springfield.   
 
B) Connection to Hypotheses 
 According to our hypothesis, it is believed that there will be a greenfield premium 
on industrial properties in the Eugene-Springfield metro area.  Our base estimates for 
greenfield industrial properties, in Column 1 of Table 2, find no evidence for a price 
premium.  In fact, it appears that being an industrial greenfield will result in a price 
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discount relative to other comparable industrial parcels.  The industrial greenfield price 
discount is, holding all other land price determinants constant, 168%.  The estimate is 
significant at the 1% level.  Part of the problem, as discussed in the data description, is 
that we have no historical measure of greenfield and that any property labeled as 
greenfield in the data is a property with no building or other improvements at present.  
This is likely to result in an adverse selection bias since properties that did sell as a 
greenfield property but were developed, would no longer show up in our data as initially 
selling as greenfield. 
 The second issue is that Greenfield properties are being compared here to 
properties with buildings on them or other improvements.  In the next section, we will 
strip away the improvement values on all properties, so that we can do a more apples-to-
apples comparison using measures of land values only. 
 The coefficient on brownfields indicates that they are negatively impacted, but it 
is not statistically significant.  It is believed that this is due to a limited number of 
observations (17 out of over 1,600 were brownfields).  The direction of the effect is 
correct, but precision is poor with so few instances of brownfield designations.  
The second aim of our research was to determine the effect of the Enterprise Zone 
on industrial prices.  Our estimates for the West Eugene Enterprise Zone indicate that 
industrial prices under the zone, while effective, sold at discounts on average of 1.69%.  
This is significant at the 5% level, which is strong evidence that industrial properties 
within the West Eugene Enterprise Zone are selling for less then comparable industrial 
properties.  At this time, it is not understood why these properties seem to sell for 
discounts relative to comparable industrial parcels. 
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Since the West Eugene Enterprise Zone was disbanded from 1997 to 2004, we 
have a clear estimate of value for buildings in this area while there is no enterprise zone 
in effect.  “West Eugene Enterprise Zone Properties” is the dummy variable for 
properties within the boundary of the enterprise zone.  This estimate suggests that there 
was no statistical difference of properties simply located in the enterprise zone relative to 
other properties in our data.  For some unknown reason, the implementation of the 
enterprise zone seems to reduce industrial parcel’s selling prices. 
 
C). Alternate Specifications and Models 
 Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 provide estimates for our examination of 
determinants of land values for different time periods of our sample data.     
 It was important to run various sensitivity checks to make sure our results hold up 
at different time intervals due to the historic nature of our data.  We ran regressions of the 
data from 1995 to 2006 (column 2) and from 2000 to 2006 (column 3).  As evident by the 
R2, our model explains more of the variation in the data when only using industrial 
properties that have sold in the last six years.  This would be expected, considering that it 
is doubtful that many properties have undergone drastic changes in their characteristics in 
the last six years relative to properties sold 10 or more years ago.  Any estimates that are 
drastically different from the results discussed above will be reviewed below.   
 With acreage, again being a measure of elasticity, our estimate suggests when we 
narrow the time horizon closer to the present; the elasticity of demand is increasing.  
However, the negative coefficient on the “acreage squared” variable suggests that for 
larger properties this elasticity is even smaller then found in the base regression.  As we 
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increase the acreage by 10%, the selling price will increase by 7.2% according to the 
2000 to 2006 estimates.  The significance levels remain the same as the base regression. 
 The estimate for the improvement ratio’s effect is also a larger, significant at the 
1% level.  For 1995 to 2006, an increase of an industrial parcel’s improvement ratio by 
10% increases the selling price by 5.19%.  This suggests the Eugene-Springfield land 
market is becoming more sensitive to changes in the improvement ratio of industrial 
properties, holding other characteristics constant, as the selling date of the parcel gets 
closer to the present.    
 For the zoning dummy variables, our estimates are now each significant at the 1% 
level from 2000 to 2006.  In part the data is more reliable considering it is unlikely the 
zoning of an industrial property has changed much in six years relative to the entire time 
period of our base regression.  An industrial property being zoned i1 will increase selling 
prices on average by about 355%, which is the largest impact of the group.  There is 
clearly a preference for being zoned i1 relative to other zoning options for comparable 
industrial properties.     
 Industrial properties that sold between 2000 to 2006 it is found that our estimate 
suggest that properties in the Eugene area, these properties are selling at discounts on 
average of about 49%.  The estimate for the enterprise zone is not significant, indicating 
no effect on industrial property selling prices relative to other comparable properties.  
Land in the boundary of the enterprise zone, as suggested by our estimates, is also not 
statistically different from other areas of the city. 
  
D) Alternative Models 
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 Column 4 of Table 2 provide estimates for our hedonic model including 
interactive terms of industrial properties in the Eugene-Springfield metro area. 
 These terms are trying to detect how the different dummy variables interact with 
each other.  For instance, we wanted to understand how a brownfield industrial property 
is affected by the enterprise zone to see if firms on the margin of purchasing a brownfield 
lot might be affected by the enterprise zone.  To do so we would want to look at 
brownfield properties within the Enterprise Zone and the way to do that is to multiply the 
variables together. 
 None of the interaction terms are statistically significant indicating there is no 
difference from these properties in the enterprise zone or Eugene from other industrial 
parcels.  
 
II. Selling price of the land specifically 
In this section we are going to attempt to tease out the selling price of the land 
itself.  We do this multiplying one minus by using our proxy variable of the value of 
buildings (improvement ratio) by the adjusted selling price of the lot. 
 
A) Main Determinants of Industrial Property Prices 
Column 1 of Table 3 provides our base estimates for determinants of industrial 
land prices in the Eugene-Springfield metro area. 
The coefficient for our acreage variable is indicating that there is still a positive 
impact to selling prices that is significant at the 1% level.  Unlike our previous findings 
our “acres squared” term is not significant.  When the acreage increases by 10%, the 
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selling price of the land rises by 5.74%.  The impact of acres is less then it was when we 
were examining the full sales price (Table 2).  The selling price of industrial lots is 
significantly described by the acreage of the lot, but their response is relatively inelastic. 
   Our coefficients for the zoning dummies indicate there is no statistical impact on 
the selling prices of industrial parcels.  It is again hard to understand why these zoning 
terms have no effect but it must be kept in mind that these are the main zoning 
classifications for industrial properties.  These estimates are relative to other zoning 
codes that we left out of the regression, such as campus industrial, which since they are 
more rare in the Eugene-Springfield area would result in these properties selling for a 
premium relative to the more common industrial zoning classifications. 
 Of the distance variables, our estimate suggests the only variable with a 
significant coefficient is the minimum distance to the Eugene city center.  The 
relationship is still a negative one but the estimate is only significant at the 5% level.  
When the distance from the Eugene city center increases by 10% the industrial properties 
selling price will decrease by 3%.  The other distance coefficients were found to be 
positive but are not statistically significant.   
 
B) Connections to Hypotheses 
The coefficient on industrial greenfield properties is now indicating that there is 
evidence of a greenfield premium, confirming our original hypothesis.  The premium 
amounts to about 17% for the average property and is significant at the 5% level.  It could 
be theorized that buyers are waiting for these greenfield properties to become more 
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valuable as industry in Eugene-Springfield continues to expand and needs more land to 
develop on. 
 The coefficient on the brownfield variable are insignificant though negative as 
expected, meaning there is no impact on the selling price of industrial properties if the 
property was at one time a brownfield.  Whereas we might expect a property with 
contamination to sell at a discount, the lack of observations in our dataset makes it hard 
for us to draw too many conclusions from these results.  Since few contamination 
problems appear in Eugene-Springfield properties, unlike more industrialized cities, local 
markets are not discounting these types of properties yet. 
 For industrial properties in the West Eugene Enterprise Zone, there is strong 
statistical evidence of a negative impact on selling prices.  These properties sell for about 
23% less then other comparable industrial properties outside of the Enterprise Zone when 
it is effective.  The estimate is significant at the 5% level.  Industrial properties located in 
Eugene do sell at premiums but this estimate is not statistically significant.  Neither is the 
estimate for the Enterprise Zone properties when it was disbanded.  When strictly looking 
at the selling value of the land we find that there is a strong evidence of a negative impact 
because of the Enterprise Zone.   
 
C) Alternate Specifications 
In Table 3, columns 2 and 3 are referenced below as we examine how our base 
regression coefficients change as we regress using different time periods for the Eugene-
Springfield metro area industrial properties.  The results stayed mostly similar except for 
what is noted. 
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 The coefficient on our logarithmic measure of acreage remains positive but when 
the time period is narrowed, the effect grows.  Precision has been lost in our estimates 
due to higher standard errors, but this has not reduced the significance level which is still 
at 1%.  
 The zoning classification coefficients are now showing negative relationships and 
Zoning Industrial 1 and Zoning Industrial 2 are significant at the 1% level when the 
industrial property sells between 2000 and 2006.  The estimate for Zoning Industrial 3 is 
only significant at the 5% level.  It was the case that i1 was significant at the 5% level 
from 1995 to 2006 while still showing a negative relationship with the selling price.  
From 2000 to 2006, being zoned as i1 reduced average prices by 91%.   A larger effect 
then was witnessed from 1995 to 2006, in which being zoned as Industrial 1 resulted in a 
price decrease on average of 189%.  Much of the gain in significance was due to gains in 
precision when looking across our different regression models.  For all of the zoning 
variables it was the case that the standard errors fell with each restrictive years sold 
regression.  
 The greenfield premium that we had found in our base regression is now 
insignificant when looking at the coefficients for the sensitivity check.  Again precision 
has been lost due to the increase in the standard error.  An interesting result is that from 
2000 to 2006 there appears to be a negative relationship between industrial greenfield’s 
and their selling prices.  This result is insignificant but points to changing conditions in 
the local land market possibly happening in the present.   
 Our estimates on the coefficients for industrial properties in the enterprise zone 
drop their significance, due to precision losses in our standard errors.  The negative 
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relationship is only significant in selling years 1995 to 2006.  The significance is gone by 
the time we reach years 2000 to 2006 but during this time range the Enterprise Zone has 
only been in operation 2 years.  With more time and more observations the negative 
statistically significant relationship between being in the Enterprise Zone and selling 
prices will return.  The other Eugene coefficients remain insignificant.  The negative 
effects on industrial properties selling prices as a result of the Enterprise Zone remain in 
our sensitivity checks. 
 
D) Alternative Model 
 Column 4 of Table 3 shows the results when including the interactive terms in our 
hedonic model.  For the most part the results are similar to the base regression in Column 
1.  The interactive terms will be discussed below and what their coefficients tell us of the 
land market in Eugene-Springfield metro area. 
 None of the interaction terms are statistically significant meaning there is no 
special interaction relative to other types of land.  For example, there is unique about an 
industrial property being a greenfield property inside the Enterprise Zone compared to 
that of a grayfield in the Enterprise Zone. 
 
Conclusion: 
 Among our results, several variables popped out with quite significant effects.  
Perhaps most interesting, was acres strong positive relationship that was not a one for one 
exchange.  In addition to this, there was never a one for one relationship between our 
improvement ratio and the price the lot sold for, indicating a one percent increase in 
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building value relative to the land value, does not increase the value of the lot by one 
percent.  Industrial zoning seems to have a strong positive effect on prices with respect to 
the building and land prices in recent years, but not overall, signifying a historical data 
collection problem.  This may indicate that buildings previously used by different class 
industrial firms are demanded for future production with their respective classifications.  
Being in Eugene has an unclear effect on prices.  Most recent transactions show a decline 
in building value, and no effect in land value.  This may reflect changing tax assessor 
rulings, tax changes, or other macro effects.  However, traveling further from Eugene’s 
center results in a decline in price, suggesting it is still valuable to be near Eugene’s 
labor.  
 We originally hypothesized that greenfields hold a premium over brownfields.  
We believe this because greenfields do not hold any inherit risks, namely contamination.  
In addition to this, we believe that location in an enterprise zone increases the value of 
the lots, all else equal.  This is believed because the tax incentives provided by enterprise 
zone classification, presumably, increase the value of the lots.  This is all based on the 
assumption that a driving factor in enterprise zone policy is to provide development in 
economically lagging areas. 
 In our preliminary regressions, we found that greenfields had a significantly 
negative effect on prices.  This was believed to be attributed to the value of the buildings 
on the lots.  Buildings in Eugene are relatively young when compared to the areas of 
previous research in the New England area (Howland, 2000, Jackson, 2001, Alberto & 
Alberini, 2005, & Shoenbaum, 2002), and more valuable as a result.  We then argued that 
the value of the buildings on grayfields and brownfields have a significantly positive 
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affect on the prices, biasing our results. After controlling for the assessed value of the 
buildings, the effect greenfields had on sales prices was significantly positive.  
Brownfield classification, however, seems to have little significant effect on prices.  It is 
unclear what the truth behind this is, due to such limited observations (total of 15 
brownfields observed).  The less significant results can be attributed to two big problems: 
one, there may not be that much of a contamination problem in Eugene (lots are not as 
aged as past research examined); two, brownfields appeared in about 1% of our 
observations, which is difficult to get a significant reading from.  
 Our second hypothesis examined enterprise zone’s effect on price of lots sold.  
Contrary to our belief that the enterprise zone increased the prices of lots, they actually 
significantly decreased the price of lots sold.  There were no significant impacts of the 
enterprise zone on price brownfields or greenfields were sold for.  This is a difficult 
relationship to examine.  We remain convinced that the relationship should at least be no 
effect, and find it hard to believe that it actually lowers the value of the land.  This may 
be related to some omitted variables or other biases, and deserves more research. 
 Although our research holds a strong percentage of attributing characteristics (R2 
> 0.4), this does not mean we have captured all characteristics within the market.  Future 
research should examine more closely the “value” the buildings hold in relation to the 
type of firm entering the market.  For example, although a retail company might highly 
value a “big” building, we believe industrial companies value the size of their factory 
even more so.  This leads us to believe that building size is an important omitted variable.  
The tax assessor’s office should be able to provide this, along with other crucial variables 
such as building age.  As buildings progress in age, they appreciate in assessed value, but 
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not necessarily in value to an industrial firm.  An additional interesting relationship exists 
in the regulations enforced by the West Eugene Enterprise Zone.  All enterprise zones 
have different regulations, and it is important to note that our research cannot be applied 
globally.  What this does offer, though, is room for research on other enterprise zones and 
their respective effects on industrial land prices and other policy goals.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
1) More detailed information of adjustments to data sets 
 Another transformation of the data that we undertook was to collapse the data 
since there were large chunks of identical observations due to reclassifications that would 
happen to the maplots over time.  A property would have the same descriptive statistics 
but would have changed in its land use description.  In the RLID data that merits another 
line item which requires us to then collapse the data into one observation point.  Since the 
observations were similar in all numerical statistics we could take the mean and sum the 
other categorical characteristics.  This would allow us to count the number of times that; 
for instance, a property was classified as an I2 property.  The summed variables were 
those of property class, zoning codes, and land use.  Since we are interested in these 
variables being dummies we created new dummy variables so that any summed variable 
would take the value of 1 when the summed variable was greater then zero. 
 There were many instances were a company bought multiple lots as part of the 
same transaction but the transaction was broken into many account numbers.  We 
collapsed these data points in a single observation. 
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Table 1 
                  Variable             |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------
      Selling Price                    |      1674    11.82988    1.289726   7.006471    16.1035
      Selling Price Land               |      1674    11.10895    1.303124   6.029808   15.88141
      Acreage                          |      1674   -.0455635    1.357057  -3.218876   7.422134
      Acreage Squared                  |      1674     1.84258    3.419201          0   55.08808
      Zoning Industrial 1              |      1674    .0179211    .1327046          0          1
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------
      Zoning Industrial 2              |      1674    .5573477    .4968488          0          1
      Zoning Industrial 3              |      1674    .1845878    .3880788          0          1
      Eugene                           |      1674    .7580645    .4283834          0          1
      Enterprise Zone Properties       |      1674    .6589008    .4742203          0          1
      Eugene Enterprise Effective      |      1674    .4796894    .4997366          0          1
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------
    Distance to Eugene City Center     |      1674    9.806501    .5553976    6.79737   10.79377
    Distance to Nearest HWY OnRamp     |      1674    8.539632     .576381   6.057962   9.519056
    Distance to Nearest I5 OnRamp      |      1674    9.920988    .6774804   7.140224   10.63929
         Greenfield                    |      1674     .172043    .3775306          0          1
Enterprise Zone Greenfield Interactive |      1674    .0800478    .2714483          0          1
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------
          Brownfield                   |      1674    .0077658    .0878073          0          1
Enterprise Zone Brownfield Interactive |      1674    .0011947    .0345547          0          1
Eugene Brownfield Interactive          |      1674    .0041816    .0645492          0          1
Eugene Greenfield Interactive          |      1674    .1266428    .3326717          0          1
 
 
 34 
Table 2 
Base Base 1995 to 2006 Base 2000 to 2006 Interactive
Selling Price Selling Price Selling Price Selling Price
ln(Acreage) 0.6 0.622 0.721 0.598
(0.023)** (0.029)** (0.041)** (0.023)**
ln(Acreage) ^2 -0.052 -0.03 -0.034 -0.051
(0.016)** (0.02) (0.03) (0.016)**
ln(Improvement Ratio) 0.384 0.519 0.4 0.385
(0.079)** (0.106)** (0.112)** (0.079)**
ln(Improvement Ratio) ^2 0.048 0.06 0.03 0.048
(0.016)** (0.021)** (0.02) (0.015)**
Zoning Industrial 1 0.454 -0.442 1.517 0.439
(0.69) (0.87) (0.329)** (0.71)
Zoning Industrial 2 -0.643 -1.242 0.611 -0.642
(0.67) (0.85) (0.180)** (0.69)
Zoning Industrial 3 -0.652 -1.319 0.527 -0.638
(0.66) (0.85) (0.157)** (0.69)
Eugene 0.331 1.177 -0.682 0.324
(0.67) (0.86) (0.228)** (0.70)
Enterprise Zone Properties 0.164 0.099 0.137 0.157
(0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.10)
Enterprise Zone Effective -0.2 -0.328 -0.277 -0.14
(0.097)* (0.127)** (0.18) (0.10)
ln(Distance to Eugene City Center) -0.446 -0.363 -0.387 -0.442
(0.064)** (0.087)** (0.145)** (0.064)**
ln(Distance to Nearest HWY On Ramp) 0.026 0.039 0.1 0.032
(0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05)
ln(Distance to Nearest I5 On Ramp) 0.127 0.05 -0.02 0.132
(0.07) (0.08) (0.12) (0.08)
Greenfield -0.988 -1.098 -1.298 -0.85
(0.086)** (0.103)** (0.142)** (0.131)**
Brownfield -0.239 0.088 -0.264 -0.134
(0.37) (0.29) (0.75) (0.30)
Enterprise Zone Greenfield Interactive -0.298
(0.17)
Enterprise Zone Brownfield Interactive -1.48
(1.87)
Eugene Brownfield Interactive 0.293
(0.38)
Eugene Greenfield Interactive 0.01
(0.18)
Constant 16.199 16.105 16.498 16.031
(0.683)** (0.916)** (1.405)** (0.690)**
Observations 1613 905 382 1613
R-squared 0.44 0.48 0.56 0.44
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% ln stands for natural log
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Table 3 
Selling Price Land Selling Price Land Selling Price Land Selling Price Land
ln(Acreage) 0.574 0.592 0.679 0.571
(0.024)** (0.030)** (0.045)** (0.024)**
ln(Acreage)^2 -0.043 -0.016 -0.021 -0.042
(0.017)** (0.02) (0.03) (0.016)**
Zoning Industrial 1 0.168 -0.762 1.047 0.154
(0.65) (0.78) (0.304)** (0.67)
Zoning Industrial 2 -0.595 -1.213 0.504 -0.598
(0.62) (0.75) (0.178)** (0.65)
Zoning Industrial 3 -0.598 -1.252 0.395 -0.586
(0.62) (0.75) (0.156)* (0.64)
Eugene 0.496 1.419 -0.234 0.489
(0.64) (0.77) (0.21) (0.66)
Enterprise Zone Properties 0.097 -0.02 0.012 0.089
(0.11) (0.13) (0.15) (0.11)
Enterprise Zone Effective -0.269 -0.359 -0.283 -0.203
(0.102)** (0.135)** (0.18) (0.11)
ln(Distance to Eugene City Center) -0.304 -0.216 -0.248 -0.299
(0.072)** (0.093)* (0.15) (0.072)**
ln(Distance to Nearest HWY On Ramp) 0.053 0.065 0.076 0.061
(0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05)
ln(Distance to Nearest I5 On Ramp) 0.082 0 -0.109 0.09
(0.08) (0.09) (0.13) (0.08)
Greenfield 0.161 0.173 -0.082 0.316
(0.073)* (0.09) (0.13) (0.126)*
Brownfield -0.199 0.125 -0.429 -0.29
(0.40) (0.37) (1.10) (0.41)
Enterprise Zone Greenfield Interactive -0.294
(0.17)
Enterprise Zone Brownfield Interactive -1.806
(1.83)
Eugene Brownfield Interactive 0.756
(0.47)
Eugene Greenfield Interactive -0.014
(0.18)
Constant 13.866 13.609 14.889 13.644
(0.776)** (1.003)** (1.508)** (0.784)**
Observations 1613 905 382 1613
R-squared 0.37 0.41 0.52 0.38
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% ln stands for natural log
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